Functional data analysis, FDA, as well as other branches of statistics and machine learning often deal with function valued parameters. Functional data and/or functional parameters may contain unexpectedly large amounts of personally identifying information, and thus developing a privacy framework for these areas is critical in the era of big data. In statistical privacy (or statistical disclosure control) the goal is to minimize the potential for identification of individual records or sensitive characteristics while at the same time ensuring that the released information provides accurate and valid statistical inference. Differential Privacy, DP, has emerged as a mathematically rigorous definition of risk and more broadly as a framework for releasing privacy enhanced versions of a statistical summary. In this paper, we develop an extensive theory for achieving DP with functional data or function valued parameters more generally. Our theoretical framework is based on densities over function spaces, which is of independent interest to FDA researchers, as densities have proven to be challenging to define and utilize for FDA models. For statistical disclosure control, we demonstrate how even small amounts of over smoothing or regularizing can produce releases with substantially improved utility. We carry out extensive simulations to examine the utility of privacy enhanced releases and consider applications to Diffusion Tensor imaging and high-resolution 3D facial imaging.
Functional data analysis, FDA, as well as other branches of statistics and machine learning often deal with function valued parameters. Functional data and/or functional parameters may contain unexpectedly large amounts of personally identifying information, and thus developing a privacy framework for these areas is critical in the era of big data. In statistical privacy (or statistical disclosure control) the goal is to minimize the potential for identification of individual records or sensitive characteristics while at the same time ensuring that the released information provides accurate and valid statistical inference. Differential Privacy, DP, has emerged as a mathematically rigorous definition of risk and more broadly as a framework for releasing privacy enhanced versions of a statistical summary. In this paper, we develop an extensive theory for achieving DP with functional data or function valued parameters more generally. Our theoretical framework is based on densities over function spaces, which is of independent interest to FDA researchers, as densities have proven to be challenging to define and utilize for FDA models. For statistical disclosure control, we demonstrate how even small amounts of over smoothing or regularizing can produce releases with substantially improved utility. We carry out extensive simulations to examine the utility of privacy enhanced releases and consider applications to Diffusion Tensor imaging and high-resolution 3D facial imaging.
1. Introduction. New studies, surveys, and technologies are resulting in ever richer and more informative data sets. Data being collected as part of the "big data revolution" occurring in the sciences have dramatically expanded the pace of scientific progress over the last several decades, but often contain a significant amount of personal or subject level information. These data and their corresponding analyses present substantial challenges for preserving subjects' privacy as researchers attempt to understand what information can be publicly released without impeding scientific advancement and policy making [39] .
One type of big data that has been heavily researched in the statistics community over the last two decades is functional data, with the corresponding branch of statistics called functional data analysis, FDA. FDA is concerned with conducting statistical inference on samples of functions, trajectories, surfaces, and other similar objects. Such tools have become increasingly necessary as our data gathering technologies become more sophisticated. FDA methods have proven very useful in a wide variety of fields including economics, finance, genetics, geoscience, anthropology, and kinesiology, to name only a few [44, 45, 23, 29, 36] . Indeed, nearly any data rich area of science will eventually come across applications that are amenable to FDA techniques. However, functional and other high dimensional data are also a rich source of potentially personally identifiable information [37, 21, 50] .
To date, there has been very little work concerning FDA and statistical data privacy, that is, statistical disclosure control (SDC) or statistical disclosure limitation (SDL), the branch of statistics concerned with limiting identifying information in released data and summaries while maintaining their utility for valid statistical inference. SDC has a rich history for both methodological developments and applications for "safe" release of altered (or masked) microdata and tabular data [14, 49, 60, 24, 31] . Hall et al. [28] provide the most substantial contribution to privacy of FDA data to date, where the authors are primarily interested in nonparametric density estimation, releasing point-wise evaluations of the estimates. They work within the framework of Differential Privacy, DP, that has emerged from theoretical computer science with a goal of designing privacy mechanisms with mathematically provable disclosure risk [16, 19] . One of the major findings of [28] is the connection between DP and Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Spaces, which we explore in this paper with even greater depth. Recently, [1] extended the work of [28] by considering a Laplace (instead of a Gaussian) mechanism and focused on releasing an approximation based on Bernstein polynomials, exploiting their close connection to point-wise evaluation on a grid or mesh. Unfortunately, the noise they consider consists of independent Laplace perturbations which can result in a sizable loss in utility when a large number of evaluations are used. In contrast, [28] use a Gaussian process, which is relatively insensitive to the number of evaluations. Other related contributions include Alvim et al. [2] who consider privacy over abstract metric spaces assuming one has a sanitized dataset, and Smith et al. [54] who examine how to best tailor the mechanism from [28] .
In this work, we move beyond [28, 1] and [54] by establishing DP for functional data more broadly. We propose a mechanism for achieving DP for releasing any set of linear functionals of a functional object, which include point-wise releases as a special case. We will show that this mechanism also protects against any nonlinear functions of the functional object or even a full function release, though the later is usually not computationally feasible without some additional structure (e.g., continuous time Markov chains). Such extensions are critical for working with transformations that are not simple point wise evaluations, such as norms and derivatives or when the objects exhibit complex nonlinear dynamics. We also provide an interesting negative result, which is uncommon in the privacy literature yet very important, that shows that not all Gaussian noises are capable of achieving DP for a particular summary, regardless of how the noise is scaled. In particular, we introduce a concept called compatibility, and show that if a noise is not compatible with a particular summary, then it is impossible to achieve DP. To establish the necessary probabilistic bounds for DP we utilize functional densities. This is also of independent interest in FDA as densities for functional data are rarely utilized due to the lack of a natural base measure [5] . Because of this, most attempts at utilizing or defining densities for functional data involve some work-around to avoid working in infinite dimensions [15, 13] . Lastly, we demonstrate these tools by considering mean function estimation via RKHS smoothing over an arbitrary domain, where in addition to the DP results we also provide guarantees on the utility of the sanitized estimate.
One of the major findings of this work is the interesting connection between regularization and privacy. In particular, we show that by slightly over smoothing, one can achieve DP with substantially less noise, thus better preserving the utility of the release. This is driven by the fact that a great deal of personal information can reside in the "higher frequencies" of a functional parameter estimate, while the "lower frequencies" are typically shared across subjects. To more fully illustrate this point, we demonstrate how a cross-validation for choosing smoothing parameters can be dramatically improved when the cross-validation incorporates the function to be released. Previous works concerning DP and regularization have primarily focused on performing shrinkage regression in a DP manner [e.g. 35, 11] and model selection with linear regression (e.g., [40] ), not exploiting the regularization to recover some utility as we propose here.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the necessary back-ground material for DP and FDA. In Section 3 we present our primary results concerning releasing a finite number of linear functionals followed by full function and nonlinear releases. We also present our work related to densities for FDA, which is of independent interest. In Section 4 we present an application to RKHS smoothing, which is especially amenable to our privacy mechanism. There we provide bounds on the global sensitivity as well as guarantees on the utility that highlight an interesting relationship between the utility, the noise to be added for privacy, and the RKHS used for smoothing. In Section 5 we present simulations to highlight the role of different parameters, while in Section 6 we present two applications, one on Diffusion Tensor Imaging of Multiple Sclerosis patients and another based on the 3D facial imaging. In Section 7 we discuss our results and present concluding remarks. All mathematical proofs and derivations can be found in the Appendix.
Background.
2.1. Differential Privacy. We begin by defining differential privacy, which was first introduced in [16, 19] , as a means for defining a mathematical framework for privacy. Let D be a countable (potentially infinite) population of records, and denote by D the collection of all n-dimensional subsets of D. Throughout we let D and D denote elements of D. Notationally, we omit the dependence on n for ease of exposition. In this work we use a form called (α, β)−DP (also commonly referred to as ( , δ)−DP), where α and β are privacy parameters with smaller values indicating stronger privacy. DP is a property of the privacy mechanism applied to the data summary, in this case f D := f (D), prior to release. For simplicity, we will denote the application of this mechanism using a tilde; sof D :=f (D) is the privacy enhanced version of f D . Probabilistically, we viewf D as a random variable indexed by D (which is not treated as random). This criteria can be defined for any probability space.
Definition 1 ( [16] ). Let f : D → Ω, where Ω is some measurable space. Letf D be random variables, indexed by D, taking values in Ω and representing the privacy mechanism. The privacy mechanism is said to achieve (α, β)−DP if for any two datasets, D and D , which differ in only one record, we have
for any measurable set A.
The most common setting is when Ω = R, i.e., the summary is real valued. In Section 3.1 we take Ω = R N , corresponding to releasing N functionals of a functional object, while in 3.2 we will consider the case when Ω = H, a real separable Hilbert space. At a high level, achieving (α, β)−DP means that the object to be released changes relatively little if the sample on which it is based is perturbed slightly. This change is related to what [16] called sensitivity. Another nice feature is that iff D achieves DP, then so does any measurable transformation of it; see [18, 19] for the original results, [59] for its statistical framework, and [17] for a more recent detailed review of relevant DP results. For convenience, we restate the lemma and its proof with respect to our notation in Appendix A.
2.2. Functional Data Analysis. Throughout we let H denote a real separable Hilbert space, i.e., a complete inner product space that contains a countably dense subset. The most commonly encountered space in FDA is L 2 [0, 1], though many other spaces are becoming of increasing interest. For example, multivariate or panel functional data, functional data over multidimensional domains (such as space-time), as well as spaces that incorporate more structure on the functions, such as Sobolev spaces and Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Spaces.
Throughout, we will let θ : D → H denote the particular summary of interest and for notational ease, we define θ D := θ(D). In Section 3.1 we consider the case where the aim is to release a finite number of continuous linear functionals of θ D , where as in Section 3.2 we consider releasing a privacy enhanced version of the entire function or some nonlinear transformation of it (such as a norm or basis expansion).
The backbone of our privacy mechanism is the same as in [28] , and is used extensively across the DP literature. In particular, we add Gaussian noise to the summary and show how the noise can be calibrated to achieve DP. We say Z is a Gaussian process in H if Z, h H is Gaussian in R, for any h ∈ H. Every Gaussian process in H is uniquely parametrized by a mean function, µ ∈ H, and a covariance operator (which is symmetric, nonnegative definite, and nuclear) C : H → H [38, Page 488]. One then has that
for any h ∈ H. We use the short hand notation N to denote the Gaussian distribution over R, but include subscripts for any other space, e.g., N H for H.
Let K be a symmetric, positive definite, bounded linear operator over H, that admits a spectral decomposition given by
where ⊗ denotes the tensor product between two elements of H, the result of which is an operator, (x ⊗ y)(h) := y, h H x. The λ i and v i denote the eigenvalues and eigenfunctions, respectively, of K, and we assume that λ 1 ≥ λ 2 ≥ . . . . Without loss of generality, one can assume that the v i form an orthonormal basis of H. The operator K can be used to define a subspace of H that is also a Hilbert space. In particular,
It is usually assumed that λ i = 0, however, the case where λ i = 0 for some i is readily included with the convention 0/0 = 0 in the above summation. In that case, it is understood that the h must lie in the range of K, which means if λ i = 0 then h, v i = 0 for all h ∈ K. For example, if only a finite number of λ i were nonzero then K would be finite dimensional. The space K is a Hilbert space when equipped with the inner product x,
and K is an integral operator with kernel k(t, s), then K is also a Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space, RKHS [4] .
Privacy Enhanced Functional Data.
In this section we present our main results. The mechanism we use for guaranteeing differential privacy is to add a Gaussian noise before releasing θ D . In other words, our releases will be based on a private versionθ D , whereθ D = θ D +δZ. However, it turns out that not just any Gaussian noise, Z, can be used, as proposed before. In particular, the options for choosing Z depend heavily on the summary θ D . This is made explicit in the following definition.
Definition 2. We say that the summary θ D is compatible with a Gaussian noise,
This implies that for a particular noise to be viable for the privacy mechanism, it must be the case that the summary resides in the weighted subspace derived from the covariance operator of the noise. Recall that every covariance operator is compact, symmetric, and positive definite and thus admits the expansion (1) . Our next definition derives from [28] , but we state it here more generally.
Definition 3. The global sensitivity of a summary θ D , with respect to a Gaussian noise Z ∼ N H (0, C) is given by
where D ∼ D means the two sets differ at one record only. The space, K, is defined in (2) with kernel K = C.
The global sensitivity (GS) is a central quantity in the theory of DP. In particular, the amount of noise, δZ, depends directly on the global sensitivity. It should be noted that there are other notions of "sensitivity" in the DP literature, such as local sensitivity, but here our focus is on the global sensitivity that typically leads to the worst case definition of risk under DP; for a detailed review of DP theory and concepts, see [17] . If a summary is not compatible with a noise, then it is possible to make the global sensitivity infinite, in which case no finite amount of noise would be able to preserve privacy in the sense of satisfying DP.
Theorem 1. If a summary θ D ∈ H is not compatible with a noise Z ∼ N H (0, C) and if there exists a D such that θ D = 0, then for any δ > 0,θ D := θ D + δZ will not achieve DP.
Proof. If the summary is not compatible, then this implies that there exists a D such that θ D K = ∞. From Rao and Varadarajan [46] the distributions δZ and θ D + δZ are thus orthogonal for any δ > 0 and so one cannot achieve DP.
We present a simple example below to help illustrate this point even further. We show that if θ D does not lie in K, then no level of noise can be added that guarantees scalar DP holds uniformly across θ D , h for any h.
Example 1. Let Z be Brownian motion over [0, 1], which means that the kernel of C is given by
The kernel, c, admits the following spectral decomposition:
and v j (t) = √ 2 sin((j − 1/2)πt).
Let D consist of N iid realizations of the following process
where Y i are iid standard normal. Then we have that
So the X i are not in the RKHS, K defined using the kernel c(t, s). Now suppose that θ D = X is a single element of D, and we aim to release a privacy enhanced version of f D := θ D , v i . Using classic results from univariate DP [e.g., 18], a private version would be
Here ∆ j denotes the scalar global sensitivity of X, v j with respect to Z , v j . We can express
However, this quantity goes to infinity as j → ∞. Therefore, there is no level of noise, δ, we can add to f D which would guarantee (α, β)-DP uniformly across the choice of h.
3.1.
Releasing Finite Projections. We begin with the simpler task of releasing a finite vector of continuous linear functionals of θ D . By the Riesz Representation Theorem, every continuous linear functional, T (·), over H is of the form T (·) = ·, h H . Thus, equivalently, we aim to release a private version of { θ D , h 1 H , . . . , θ D , h N H } for some finite number N , and fixed {h i ∈ H} N i=1 .
Theorem 2. Assume θ D is compatible with Z ∼ N (0, C), and definẽ
. Thenf D achieves (α, β)-DP for any finite choice of N and any h i ∈ H.
Theorem 2 can be viewed as an extension of [28] who allow for point-wise releases only. If the Hilbert space H is also taken to be an RKHS, then Theorem 2 implies point-wise releases are protected as well, since in an RKHS point-wise evaluations are also continuous linear functionals. However, this theorem allows the release of any functional. Additionally, notice that while f D must lie in K, the h i can be any functions in H, which dramatically increases the release options as compared to [28] or [1] .
Full Function and Nonlinear
Releases. While Section 3.1 covers a number of important cases, it does not cover all releases of potential interest. In particular, full function releases are not protected and neither are nonlinear releases, such as norms or derivatives. It should be noted that a full function release is not usually practically possible, however in some situations such as continuous time Markov chains, full paths can be completely summarized using a finite number of values, but these values are not simple point wise evaluations or linear projections and thus not covered under [27, 1] or our results from Section 3.1. To guarantee privacy for these types of releases, we need to establish (α, β)-DP for the entire function, not just finite projections. This means that in Definition 1, the space is taken to be H which is infinite dimensional.
In previous works [e.g., 20, 28] to establish the probability inequalities like in Definition 1, bounds based on multivariate normal densities were used. This presents a serious problem for FDA as there is nearly no work in the literature of FDA which employs densities. This is due to the great difficulty in defining them for Hilbert space processes. For example, [15] are one of the few to tackle this problem, but get around it by defining a density only for finite "directions" of functional objects. Another example is [7] who define psuedo-densities by carefully controlling "small ball" probabilities. Both works claim that for a functional object the density "generally does not exist." However, this turns out to be a technically incorrect claim, while still often being true in spirit. The correct statement is that, in general, it is difficult to define a useful density for functional data.
In particular, to work with likelihood methods, a family of probability measures should all have a density with respect to the same base measure, which, at present, does not appear to be possible in general for functional data.
The concept of defining densities over function spaces has a very deep history. Given its potential importance in FDA, we will attempt to reference some of the major works. These results have been used extensively in areas such as mathematical finance and spatial statistics. Recall that a density is a Radon-Nikodym derivative (RND) of one measure with respect to another (herein called the base measure). For probability models, the base measure is typically Lebesgue or counting measure for continuous and discrete random variables, respectively. RNDs were first introduced in the works of [43] and [42] . The existence of RNDs depends on the absolute continuity of measures and thus a great deal of work that followed focused on determining when infinite dimensional measures were equivalent or orthogonal; for example, see [9, 8, 10, 33, 26, 3, 22, 25, 56, 48, 51, 57, 58] . In addition, once two measures are equivalent, then the question becomes, what is the density of one with respect to the other? This also has a very rich body of literature including [47, 46, 52] and [53] . In the early 1970s Black and Scholes published their landmark paper on option pricing [6] , which utilized much of this theory, while Ibragimov and Rozanov published a book [32] summarizing much of the discussed work, especially as it related to stationary Gaussian processes. Thereafter, much of the work has been focused more on specific areas of application as the bulk of the foundational theory had been established.
The difficulty in defining densities in infinite-dimensional spaces comes from the fact there is no general way to define and utilize a common base or reference measure [12] , such as Lebesgue measure, however our goal in using densities is more straightforward. We require densities (with respect to the same base measure) for the family of probability measures induced by {θ D + δZ : D ∈ D}, where Z is a mean zero Gaussian process in H with covariance operator C. It turns out that this is in fact possible because we are adding the exact same type of noise to each element. We give the following theorem, which can be viewed as a slight generalization and reformulation of Theorem 6.1 from [46] . Lemma 1. Assume that the summary θ D is compatible with a noise Z. Denote by Q the probability measure over H induced by δZ, and by {P D : D ∈ D} the family of probability measures over H induced by θ D + δZ. Then every measure P D has a density over H with respect to Q, and the density is given by
Q almost everywhere. This density is unique up to a set of Q measure zero.
At this point we stress that the noise is actually chosen by the user; it is not a property of the data. The primary hurdle for the user is ensuring that the summary is compatible with the selected noise. As we will see in Section 4, one can accomplish this by using specific estimators. Lemma 1 implies that, for any measurable set A ⊂ H we have
which we exploit in our proofs later on.
To see why the density should be of the form given in Lemma 1, consider the density of
where v j is the jth eigenfunction of the covariance operator of Z. This is a vector of independent normal random variables with means { θ D , v j } J j=1 and variances {δ 2 λ j } J j=1 , which are the corresponding eigenvalues. While one typically defines the density of X J with respect to Lebesgue measure, we can instead define it with respect to another normal, namely Z J = { δZ, v j } J j=1 , which has the same distribution as X J except with zero mean. To define this density, we need only take the ratio of their densities with respect to Lebesgue measure. This gives
Now we see that if we were to take x j = h, v j then we could take limits of the above quantity, with respect to J, and, by Parceval's identity, we would obtain the expression in Lemma 1. A rigorous proof can be found in the appendix. Now that we have a well defined density we can establish differential privacy for entire functions.
Theorem 3. Let f D := θ D , and assume that it is compatible with a noise Z, thenf D := f D +δZ achieves (α, β)-DP over H, where δ is defined in Theorem 2.
We also have the following corollary. Together, Theorem 3 and Corollary 1 imply that the Gaussian mechanism gives very broad privacy protection for functional data, as nearly any transformation or manipulation of the privacy enhanced release is guaranteed to maintain DP; this is known as a postporocessing property (e.g., see [17] ). All the proofs can be found in Appendix A.
Global Sensitivity Bounds for RKHS Smoothing.
In this section we consider the problem of estimating a mean function µ from a sample X 1 , . . . , X n that are iid elements of H with E X i = µ and X i H ≤ τ < ∞ for all i. In [28] one can also find examples for kernel density estimation and support vector machines. As is usual in the DP literature, one assumes that the data is standardized so that it is bounded, usually with τ = 1. In this case, the sample mean µ = n −1 n i=1 X i is root-n consistent and asymptotically normal [36] .
While we have thus far been fairly general in terms of H, in Sections 5 and 6.1 we will illustrate how to produce private releases of mean function estimates based on RKHS smoothing in more specific settings. Here we continue to provide general results, which are actually broader than just RKHS smoothing, however, in the case where H = L 2 [0, 1], the methods we describe here are RKHS smoothers, and thus we will use the term 'RKHS' to describe the more general settings as well. Here we derive a corresponding bound on the global sensitivity as well as utility guarantees. There are, of course, a multitude of methods for estimating smooth functions, however, an RKHS approach is especially amenable to our privacy mechanism. In this case we can define an RKHS smoother by using the kernel of the noise, C, to define the space K. However, the two kernels need not be exactly the same, and in particular, we assume that K = C η for some η ≥ 1. Here C η has the same eigenfunctions as C, but the eigenvalues have been raised the power η. This allows one greater flexibility in terms of smoothing and turns out to be helpful for deriving utility guarantees. We define the RKHS estimate of the mean μ
where φ is the penalty parameter. The norm · η is defined as · 2 η = C −η ·, · . While the most natural candidate is η = 1, which would be the K norm, taking something slightly larger can actually help with statistical inference as we will see later on. Here, we can see the advantage of an RKHS approach as it forces the estimate to lie in the space K which means that the compatibility condition, as discussed in theorems 1 and 2, is satisfied. A kernel different from the noise could be used, but one must be careful to make sure that the the compatibility condition is met. If (λ j , v j ) are the eigenvalue/function pairs of the kernel K and {X i = ∞ j=1 x ij v j : i = 1, . . . , N }, with x ij = X i , v j , then the estimate can be expressed aŝ
see Appendix B for details. We then have the following result.
Theorem 4. If the H norm of all elements of the population is bounded by a constant 0 < τ < ∞ then the GS for the RKHS estimate of the RKHS mean is bounded by
or more simply
The resulting bound is practically very useful. One can rescale the data so that their H bound is, for example, 1, and then the remaining quantities are all tied to the noise/RKHS that is used. Thus, the bound can be practically computed and releases that are guaranteed to achieve DP can be constructed.
We conclude with a final theorem that provides a guarantee on the utility ofμ + δZ. One interesting note is that in finite dimensional problems, the magnitude of the noise added for privacy is usually of a lower order than the statistical error of the estimate. However, in the infinite dimensional case, this is no longer true unless η > 1, which is why it is included. This is driven by the fact that the bias is of the order φ, and thus φ must go to zero like N −1 if it is to balance the variance ofμ. In this case, we have that δ 2 N −2+1/η . We see that if η = 1, then δ 2 is also of the order N −1 , while if η > 1, then it is of a lower order and thus asymptotically negligible. We remind the reader that the noise and thus C is arbitrary, so η can be chosen in a way that is appropriate for µ by using a rougher noise.
Theorem 5. Assume the X i are iid elements of H with norm bounded by τ < ∞. Definẽ
If the tuning parameter, φ, satisfies φ ∝ N −1 and if µ η < ∞ then we have
whileμ achieves (α-β) DP in H.
Empirical Study.
In this section we present simulations with H = L 2 [0, 1] to explore the impact of different parameters on the utility of sanitized releases. This exploration will occur via the problem of estimating the mean function from a random sample of functional observations using RKHS smoothing, as discussed in Section 4. The quantities we will explore include the kernel function K(t, s), used to define K, the privacy parameters, (α, β), and the penalty parameter, φ, that (combined with K) controls the level of smoothing. For simplicity, we assume that η = 1, but we will explore this choice further in Section 6.2.
For the RKHS, K, we consider four popular kernels:
Each kernel is from the Matérn family of covariances [55] , though the first is also known as the Gaussian or squared exponential kernel and the last is also known as the exponential, Laplacian, or Ornstein-Uhlenbeck kernel. We simulate data using the Karhunen-Loeve expansion, a common approach in FDA simulation studies. In particular we take
where the scores, U ij , are drawn uniformly between (−0.4, 0.4) in all scenarios. The functions, u j (t), are taken as the eigenfunctions of K 1 (though each of the kernels lead to very similar eigenfunctions) and m was taken as the largest value such that λ m was numerically different than zero in R (usually about m = 50). The remaining parameters will be fixed in all scenarios, except for the one where they are explicitly varied to consider their effect.
• The penalty parameter we take to be φ = 0.001, except in Scenario 1.
• The range parameter for the kernel used to define K we take to be ρ = 0.001, except in Scenario 2. • The covariance function for the noise will be K 1 , except in Scenario 3. In all settings the RKHS kernel and the noise kernel will be taken to be the same. • The parameter p, which controls the smoothness of the X i (t), will be taken as p = 4, except in Scenario 4. • The DP parameters will be set at α = 1 and β = 0.1, except in Scenario 5.
• The sample size will be taken as N = 25, except in Scenario 6.
• The mean function will be taken as µ(t) = 0.1 sin(πt), except Scenario 7.
All of the curves are generated on an equally spaced grid between 0 and 1, with 100 points.
Note that we take τ = sup X i H for any i ∈ 1, . . . , N and thus all qualities needed for Theorem 4 are known. In all of these settings the risk is fixed by choosing the α and β in the definition of DP. We thus focus on the utility of the privacy enhanced curves by comparing them graphically to the original estimates.Ideally, the original estimate will be close to the truth and the privacy enhanced version will be close to the original estimate. What we will see is that by compromising slightly on the former, one can makes substantial gains in the latter.
Scenario 1: Varying penalty term φ. In this setting all of the previously discussed defaults are used except the penalty, φ, that varies from 10 −6 to 1. In Figure 1 we plot all of the generated curves in grey, the RKHS smoothed mean in green, and the sanitized estimate in red. We can see that as the penalty increases, both estimates shrink towards each other and to zero. There is a clear "sweet spot" in terms of utility, where the smoothing has helped reduce the amount of noise one has to add to the estimate while not over smoothing. This concept will be explored more in Section 6.1.
Scenario 2: Varying kernel range parameter ρ. Here all defaults are used except the range parameter for the noise and RKHS (which are taken to be the same in all settings) that ranges from 0.002 to 2. The results are presented in Figure 2 . We see very similar patterns to Scenario 1, where increasing ρ increases the smoothing of both the estimate and its privacy enhanced version. However, increasing ρ smooths more than it shrinks and there is still a non-negligible difference between the two estimates for larger values, (e.g., ρ = 0.2). Practically, both ρ and φ should be chosen together for the best performance, which we will explore further in Section 6.1.
Scenario 3: Varying the kernel function k(t, s).
Here we consider the four different kernels given in (4) for both the noise and RKHS kernel (which are taken to be the same). The results are summarized in Figure 3 . All kernels give roughly the same pattern, however, K 1 produces curves which are infinitely differentiable, while the exponential kernel produces curves that are nowhere differentiable (they follow an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process). The two Matérn covariances give paths that have either one (K 3 ) or two (K 2 ) derivatives. Since the underlying function to be estimated is already very smooth, the kernel does not have a substantial impact. However, for more irregular shapes, this choice can play a substantial role on the efficiency of the resulting RKHS estimate. In this setting we vary p from 1.1 to 4, which determines the smoothness of the data, X n (t). Note that p has to be strictly larger than 1 or the X i will not be square integrable. Figure 4 summarizes these results. As we can see, the smoothness of the curves has a smaller impact on the utility of the sanitized estimates as compared to other parameters. As the curves become smoother, the global sensitivity decreases implying the need for less noise being added in order to maintain the desired privacy level, and thus resulting in a higher utility for the privacy enhanced curves. However, the smoothness, in terms of derivatives, of the estimates is not affected, as this is determined by the kernel.
Scenario 5: Varying the privacy parameters (α, β). In this setting we vary the privacy parameters, α and β. Figure 5 present the effects of varying α from 5 to 0.1 while in Figure 6 we vary β from 0.1 to 10 −6 . As we decrease the parameters, we are requiring a stricter form of privacy, which is reflected in the plots; recall that β = 0 will give us the stricter form of DP, α-DP (also called -DP). As we decrease these values, the overall noise added increases, and we expect larger deviations of the sanitized estimates from the mean. There is less sensitivity in the output to changes in β than to α. However, as with the previous scenario these parameters play no role in the overall smoothness, in terms of derivatives of the resulting estimates.
Scenario 6: Varying sample size N. In Figure 7 we vary the sample size from 5 to 100. The results are very similar to changing β and α, as the sample size does not influence the smoothness of the curves (in terms of derivatives), but the accuracy of the estimate (green curve) gets much better and so does the utility of the privacy enhanced version. Figure 8 we consider three additional mean functions. Overall, the actual function being estimated does not influence the utility of the privacy enhanced version, only the accuracy of the original estimate. This is because the noise to be added is computed from the different smoothing parameters as well as the range of the L 2 norm of the data, not the underlying estimate itself. Original and private RKHS smoothing mean with Gaussian Kernel (K 1 ) for different initial mean functions µ 6. Applications. In this section we illustrate our method on two applications. The first, in Section 6.1, is an application involving brain scans (diffusion tensor imaging, DTI) of patients with multiple sclerosis. This data is part of the refund package in R and has become popular for illustrating new methods, however, it is also a fairly sensitive study and well motivates the needs for privacy tools for functional data.
Our second application, in Section 6.2, stems from collaborative work with Dr. Mark Shriver in the department of anthropology at Penn State University. The study, called ADAPT, involves collecting 3D facial scans on thousands of human subjects. Given how identifiable faces are, this application to further highlight the needs for privacy tools. We also use this data to emphasize just how hard the problem is when working with objects, such as faces, that humans are very good at visually identifying. We will see in this setting that, compared to our simulations or DTI, it is much harder to produce seemingly reasonable sanitized estimates, which we hope will help motivate other researchers to also consider this type of privacy preservation and data sharing problems. 6.1. Diffusion Tensor Imaging. Regression with Functional Data or refund [30] is an R package that includes a variety of tools related to both linear and nonlinear regression for functional data.
DTI or Diffusion Tensor Imaging is a data set in refund that gives fractional anisotropy (FA) tract profiles for the corpus callosum (CCA) and the right corticospinal tract (RCST) for patients with multiple sclerosis as well as controls. This type of imaging data is becoming more common and the privacy concerns can be substantial. Images of the brain or other major organs might be quite sensitive source of information, especially if the study is related to some complex disease such as cancer, HIV, etc. Thus it is useful to illustrate how to produce privacy enhanced versions of function valued statistics such as mean functions. We focus on the CCC data, which includes 382 patients measured at 93 equally spaced locations along the CCA, and use them to illustrate our proposed methodology.
Our aim is to release a privacy enhanced RKHS smoothing estimate of the mean function. We consider only the kernels K 1 , K 3 and K 4 which correspond to the Gaussian kernel, Matérn kernel with ν = 3 2 , and the exponential kernel, respectively. In all settings we take (α, β) = (1, 0.1) and select the penalty, φ, and range parameter, ρ, according to two different approaches. The first is regular Cross Validation, CV, and the second we call Private Cross Validation, PCV. In CV we fix φ and then take the ρ that gives the minimum 10-fold cross validation score. We do not select φ based on cross validation because, based on our observations, the minimum score is always obtained at the minimum φ for this data. In PCV we take nearly the same approach, however, when computing the CV score we take the expected difference (via Monte-Carlo) between our privacy enhanced estimate and the left out fold from the original data. In other words, we draw a sample of privacy enhanced estimates, compute a CV score for each one, and then average the CV scores. In our simulations we use 1000 draws from the distribution of the sanitized estimate. We then find both the φ and ρ which give the optimal PCV score based on a grid search.
We begin by presenting the results for CV. For each of the kernels, we fixed a value for φ ∈ {0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.03} and then vary the ρ between [0.01, 2]. Table 1 shows the optimal parameters, based on CV, for each kernel. For each kernel, we used the parameter values in Table 1 Table 1 : Optimum kernel range parameters ρ for different kernels with using CV for each fixed penalty parameter φ in DTI dataset produce privacy enhanced estimates. The results are given in Figures 9, 10 and 11 , for exponential, Matern, and Gaussian, respectively. In each case, we see that the utility of the privacy enhanced versions increases as φ increases, however, the largest values of φ produce estimates that are over smoothed. There is a good trade-off between privacy and utility with φ = 0.01 and K 3 or K 1 (see figures 10 and 11), while K 4 is a bit rougher and does not perform as well (e.g., Figure 9 ). Turning to PCV, Table 2 shows the range we varied the (φ, ρ) and also the optimums which give the minimum PCV. We use the optimal parameters to generate privacy enhanced estimates, given in Figure 12 . Here we see that the utility of the privacy enhanced estimates is excellent, especially for K 1 . Using PCV tends to over smooth the original estimates (green lines), however, by slightly over smoothing we make substantial gains in utility as we add less noise. 6.2. 3D Facial Imaging. In this section we present an application of our methodology to 3D facial imagin data. Due to the sensitive nature of the data, we work with simulated faces that are produced using a fitted model from Kang et al. [34] . Mimicking the size of the original data set (over 6000 faces), we work with 5000 simulated faces. Our goal is to highlight the difficulty in sanitizing an object as complicated as a face and to further highlight the role smoothing plays in producing sanitized estimates.
Each face is viewed as a 2D manifold sitting in R 3 and is sampled densely at 7150 points. The exact construction of the functional units is quite involved and thus we refer to [34] for complete 
Here m j ∈ M 0 and Y i (M 0 ) = Y i . Note that the 2D embedding is not strictly necessary, but substantially simplifies the computational burden by not having to directly work with on a Manifold domain.
Our aim is to estimate the RKHS smoothing mean, µ, and its sanitized version and see how the different parameters can affect the privacy and utility of the sanitized version. An exponential kernel was selected to estimate each coordinates of µ separately. We fix the η = 1, α = 2, β = 0.1, and the range parameter of the kernel at ρ = 0.02. We varied the smoothing parameters on φ ∈ {10 −6 , 10 −7 , 10 −8 } and compared the RKHS smoothing mean and its corresponding sanitized version in Figures 13, 14 and 15 .
Comparing the results to Section 6.1 raises few interesting points. When dealing with the DTI curves, a little extra wiggle in the estimates is not so noticeable. However, humans are so good at identifying faces that any extra distortion becomes immediately noticeable. In Figure 13 , the estimate is over smoothed, but is nearly identical to the sanitized output. In Figure 14 the features of the estimated mean face become clearer, but now the sanitized estimate has a bit of distortion present. In particular, we see that some waves/wrinkles become present, though they are fairly mild. In Figure 15 , the estimated mean face has even more fine detail included, but the distortion of the sanitized estimate is quite substantial. In addition to the waves/wrinkles introduced, the nose, brows, and lips have all been oddly distorted.
While it is encouraging that our procedure can produce a sanitized estimate for such complex data, clearly such objects need a more calibrated approach. While we tried other kernels with various tuning parameters, none produced anything substantially better than what we presented here. We thus believe there are a lot of interesting opportunities for research in this area, including how best to assess quantitatively the statistical utility of privatized functional data. For the computational details and their corresponding challenges see Appendix C. Conclusions. In this work we have provided a mechanism for achieving (α, β)-DP for a wide range of summaries related to functional parameter estimates. This work expands dramatically upon the work of [28, 1, 54] , who explored this topic in the context of point-wise releases of functions. Our work covers theirs as a special case, but also includes full function releases and nonlinear releases, that have not been considered before in statistical privacy literature. In general, functional data can be highly identifiable compared to scalar data. In biomedical settings, for example, a study may collect and analyze many pieces of information such as genomic sequences, biomarkers, and biomedical images, which either alone or linked with each other or other demographic information, lead to greater disclosure risk; for a recent example of potential identification risks related to such data, see [41] The heart of our work utilizes densities for functional data in a way that has not yet been explored in the functional data literature. Previously, usable densities for functional data were thought not to exist [15] and researchers instead relied on various approximations to densities. Here we showed how useful forms for densities can be constructed and we utilized them in our theoretical results. However, it is still unclear how extensively these densities can be used for other FDA problems. At the heart of this issue is the orthogonality of probability measures; in infinite dimensional spaces dealing with the orthogonality of measures becomes a major issue, which has a direct impact on the utility of density based methods for FDA.
The literature on privacy for scalar and multivariate data is quite extensive, while there has been very little work done for FDA and related objects. Therefore, there are many opportunities for developing additional theory and methods for such complicated data. One issue that we believe will be especially important is the role of smoothing and regularization in preserving the utility of privacy enhanced releases. As we have seen, a bit of extra smoothing can go a long way in terms of maintaining privacy, however, the type of smoothing may need to be properly tailored to the application for much complicated objects, such as faces.
If we show that P is a projection operator, i.e., symmetric and idempotent, we will have the desired bound:
Second, P is symmetric with respect with the K inner product since
Hence P is a projection operator from H to K, and the claim of the theorem holds.
Proof of lemma 1. We aim to prove that dP D dQ (h) = exp − 1 2δ 2 θ D . Decompose H = K 1 K 2 where for x ∈ K 1 we have dP D dP D (x) ≤ e α and for x ∈ K 2 we have dP D dP D (x) > e α . Then trivially we have that P D (A) = P D (A ∩ K 1 ) + P D (A ∩ K 2 ).
Using the definition of K 1 we have that
The proof will be complete if we can show that
This is equivalent to showing that
where X ∼ N (0, δ 2 C). This can equivalently be stated as
However X, C −1 (f D − f D ) H is a normal random variable with mean zero and covariance
So, if Z ∼ N (0, 1) then we have that as long as α ≤ 1 [28] .
Proof of Theorem 4. The upper bound for ∆ 2 n is derived as following:
Proof of NEW Theorem 4. The upper bound for ∆ 2 n is derived as following:
We can also derive a fairly crude bound for the above by noticing that the function f (x) =
x (x + φ) 2 reaches its maximum value at x = φ (follows from basic calculus). Thus, we can also use the bound
however, note that the λ j are computable since they are based on the chosen kernel, thus doing the maximum directly could result in smaller sensitivity.
APPENDIX B: DERIVATION OF RKHS ESTIMATE
Recall that
We can express g as
We then have that
C(X n ), X n K − 2 C(X), M K + C(M ), M K + φ M, M K .
We now introduce a lemma concerning derivatives. Setting the above equal to zero we have that C(X) = C(μ) + φM.
orμ = (C + φI) −1 C(X).
In addition,μ can be written asμ(t) = ∞ j=1 μ, v j H v j (t). So the properties (7) and C(h 1 ), h 2 K = h 1 , h 2 H imply that
Now if (λ j , v j ) are the eigenvalues/eigenfunctions of C and X i (t) = ∞ j=1 x ij v j (t) then we havê
